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Abstract
In nite perfect information extensive (FPIE) games, backward induction (BI) gives
rise to all pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and iterative elimination of
weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) may give dierent outcomes for dierent orders of
elimination. Duggan recently posed several conjectures in an eort to better understand
the relationship between BI and IEWDS in FPIE games. One conjecture states that the
unique BI strategy prole in FPIE games with generic payos is guaranteed to survive
IEWDS when all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated at every round. This paper
exhibits a counterexample to this conjecture.
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Finite perfect information extensive (FPIE) games are well-understood.  Backward 
induction (BI) gives rise to all pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the 
game, and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) may give 
different outcomes for different orders of elimination.  Duggan ([1]) recently posed 
several conjectures in an effort to better understand the relationship between BI and 
IEWDS.  I address these conjectures here and in [3].  This paper deals with the 
question: Does the unique BI strategy profile in FPIE games with generic payoffs 
always survive IEWDS when all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated at every 
round? 
  
 FPIE games with generic payoffs are a class of FPIE games where no player 
receives the same payoff at two distinct terminal nodes.  Such games satisfy ui(x) = 
ui(y) ‹ uj(x) = uj(y), for any two terminal nodes x and y, where ui(x) denotes player i’s 
payoff at x.  As shown by Moulin, any games satisfying this condition are dominance 
solvable ([2], [4]).  In other words, using Moulin’s order of iterative elimination of 
weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS), if S denotes the set of strategies in the game, Z
k
 
denotes all weakly dominated strategies in S\Z
1
, …, Z
k-1
, and S
¶
 =  S\Z
1
, …, Z
m
 denotes 
the set of strategies when no further eliminations are possible, each player’s payoff 
function is constant on S
¶
. 
  
 The unique backward induction (BI) strategy profile need not survive IEWDS for all 
orders of elimination ([5]).  Consider, for example, the following FPIE game with 
generic payoffs: 
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Here one valid order of IEWDS is to first eliminate strategy BE and then eliminate 
strategy D.  In this case, the unique BI strategy profile, (AE, D), is eliminated.  
However, Osborne and Rubinstein note that the BI strategy profile in FPIE games with 
generic payoffs always survives IEWDS for some order of elimination ([5]).  In fact, in 
this example, the BI strategy profile is not eliminated in the order of elimination 
considered by Moulin.  Duggan ([1]) notes that if the BI strategy profile survives 
IEWDS for this order of elimination, then the unique path of play realized by IEWDS is 
equivalent to the unique path of play realized by BI.  With these results in mind, 
Duggan proposes an open problem:  Is the BI strategy profile guaranteed to survive 
IEWDS under this order of elimination? 
  
 Duggan conjectured that this was true, but I demonstrate the following 
counterexample: 
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The unique BI strategy profile is (BF, DH).  But in Moulin’s order of elimination, AF 
and CG are eliminated in the first round of IEWDS, and AE, DG, and DH are 
eliminated in the final round of IEWDS.  This leaves just the strategy profiles (BE, CH) 
and (BF, CH), so the BI strategy profile need not survive IEWDS using Moulin’s order 
of elimination. 
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